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South Africa: The Politics of Racial Reform

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

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

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SOUTH AFRICA: THE POLITICS OF RACIAL REFORM

Information available as of 28 November 1980 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum.

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CONTENTS

	Page
FOREWORD	v
SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS	1
DISCUSSION	5
The Legacy of Apartheid	5
Forces for Change	6
The Debate Over Reform	7
Reform Under Botha	9
Botha's Commitment	13
Reform and the New Politics	14
Nonwhite Reaction	16
Prospects for Change Through 1982	19
Implications for Stability	21

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FOREWORD

This Interagency Intelligence Memorandum represents the Intelligence Community's first in-depth assessment of internal South African political dynamics as they pertain to the process of racial reform. The ruling Afrikaner minority's thinking on the need for reform of the apartheid system is in a state of flux. Hence, the memorandum's projections are limited to a relatively short period of time: the next two years. Follow-on assessments by the Intelligence Community will probably be required within this time frame.

The memorandum was prepared under the auspices of the National Intelligence Officer for Africa. The Bureau of Intelligence and Research of the Department of State, the Defense Intelligence Agency, and the Central Intelligence Agency participated in its drafting. It has been coordinated with Intelligence Community representatives at the working level. Research was completed on 28 November 1980.

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SUMMARY AND KEY JUDGMENTS

The United States has a longstanding interest in the responsiveness of White South Africans to Nonwhite aspirations for political, economic, and social equality. At stake are declared American principles as well as US objectives in preventing racial conflict in South Africa from jeopardizing US economic and strategic interests there and from creating openings for the Soviets throughout the region.

The pressures for change in South Africa's racial policies are the product of a complex dynamic. The major external forces for reform have been increasingly hostile international opinion and the steady advance of Black nationalism in southern Africa. However, the main effect of foreign criticism and the threat of international sanctions has been to spur the South African regime to greater efforts toward military and economic self-sufficiency.

Internal factors have been more telling in their impact:

— Apartheid as a doctrine has been seriously undermined by its failure to achieve the physical separation of the races. This goal has become increasingly unrealizable in the face of a growing Black population and the influx of unemployed Blacks to the urban areas.

— Blacks are increasing in economic importance as low White birth rates and decreasing immigration make the pool of Black labor the more necessary to maintain economic growth.

The Soweto riots of 1976 accelerated the breakdown in the White and particularly Afrikaner consensus on apartheid. The government saw the need for a more coherent strategy to maintain White control. The subsequent relaxation of some of the restrictions of petty apartheid stimulated a debate over the necessity for far-reaching changes in racial policies.

As the debate has continued it has become clear that there is virtually no quarrel within the Afrikaner community over the long-term objective—continued White political control and protection of Afrikaner privilege and identity. But three main lines of argument have emerged regarding the strategy and tactics for maintaining this objective:

— Conservative Afrikaners, the *verkramptes*, oppose any significant tinkering with a system they believe has served Whites well.

— Moderate Afrikaners, the *verligtes*, would approve a broad lifting of restrictions in the economic and labor fields and a vague promise of eventual limited Nonwhite participation in the political realm.

— The more progressive among the moderate Afrikaners advocate reshaping the political structure into a confederal system with decisionmaking powers granted to Nonwhites, albeit in very restricted areas.

The scope and pace of change over the next two to three years will in large part depend on the attitudes of the Afrikaner community at large. Although Afrikaners as a group appear more receptive to change now than at any time in the past, the conservative Afrikaner establishment remains powerful enough to hinder any push for reform undertaken by Prime Minister Botha's government.

Botha has categorically rejected a one-man, one-vote formula in a unitary state. He and his supporters believe, however, that apartheid must be modernized in order to assure White survival and have moved in a variety of ways to signal the seriousness and urgency of their push for change. It is clear that Botha is not working from a blueprint and is moving in an ad hoc manner that gives him the flexibility to press or back off from given policies as circumstances require.

Nonwhites have grown pessimistic about the prospects for meaningful change and have, as a result, rebuffed new government initiatives and rejected most of their leaders who have consulted with White authorities. Urban Blacks, as well as the younger generation of Asians and Coloreds who identify with them, have demonstrated their lack of respect for the government's timid reforms by consumer boycotts, labor unrest, and student demonstrations.

The pace of reform over the next two to three years will not be sufficient to satisfy Nonwhite demands, particularly if reforms are undertaken without consultation. Racial tensions will rise in urban areas as Nonwhite expectations continue to outpace the ability of government to deliver reforms. Indeed, reforms will likely stimulate more strident Nonwhite demands for change. Prospects, then, are as follows:

— An overall pattern of urban unrest, interspersed with sporadic and spontaneous violence, will mark the next few years. Violence will remain at a lower level in rural areas, but the growing poverty of the government-established homelands may result in increasing rural unrest. Rising urban and rural unrest can probably be contained but only at the cost of harsher repression.

— Black insurgent groups, primarily the African National Congress (ANC), which is backed by the Soviets, will continue to pull off spectacular terrorist operations. The ANC may also expand its activities in rural areas and will increase its efforts to infiltrate Nonwhite student and labor organizations. Government security forces, however, probably will be able to prevent ANC activities from becoming a serious threat to stability.

— Faced with racial unrest and conservative resistance to his policies, Botha will be tempted to move away from parliamentary institutions to concentrate power in his own hands. He will be aided by a new elite, dominated by the military but also including businessmen and technocrats, who see change as the only way to maintain a strong economy and national security. Whites would probably acquiesce, albeit reluctantly, in this shift of power if Botha found it necessary to deal forcefully with rising Nonwhite violence and White obstructionism.

— Botha is not likely to find himself under pressure to this degree before the end of 1982, but he appears to be positioning himself to rule South Africa as a strongman at some point in the future.

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DISCUSSION

1. The United States has a longstanding interest in the responsiveness of White South Africans to Nonwhite aspirations for political, economic, and social equality. At stake are declared American principles as well as US objectives in preventing racial instability in South Africa from jeopardizing US economic and strategic interests there and from creating openings for the Soviets throughout the region. US relations elsewhere in Africa are also involved.

2. This memorandum will address the question of whether Prime Minister P. W. Botha's administration and the ruling Afrikaner-dominated National Party are willing and able to push reforms far enough and fast enough to keep racial violence from escalating. The Colored riots in mid-1980 near Cape Town, mounting Black labor and student unrest throughout South Africa, and Botha's recent unwillingness to buck the right wing of his party have all given special point to this question.[1]

3. The memorandum will review Botha's reform policies as they have unfolded since he took office two years ago, discuss his style and strategy, analyze the reaction of Nonwhites and Whites to the program, and draw conclusions about the prospects for change over the next two to three years. Special emphasis will be given to the implications for internal stability. This paper focuses on the domestic South African political scene. It is in many respects a follow-on to IIM 79-10025, December 1979, which discussed South Africa's overall strategy for survival in an increasingly hostile world. The memorandum's projections are based on assumptions that external pressures for reform will not increase dramatically over current levels and that Pretoria will continue to believe in the efficacy of the economic, military, and foreign policy aspects of this overall strategy.

[1] This paper uses conventional terminology in referring to South Africa's racial groups. Specifically, it uses the term "Blacks" when referring to South Africans of tribal lineage and the term "Nonwhites" as a collective label for Blacks, Asians (mostly Indians), and Coloreds (persons of mixed race). Usage of these terms among observers of South Africa is changing. The term "Africans" is being applied increasingly to South Africans of tribal lineage, and the term "Blacks" is used as a collective label for all the Nonwhite ethnic groups—including Coloreds and Asians. Such broad usage of the term "Blacks," however, could be confusing to an American audience. Similarly, although the label "Nonwhite" is being increasingly avoided because of its possible pejorative connotations, it is arguably the least confusing term to use when referring collectively to Blacks, Asians, and Coloreds.

The Legacy of Apartheid

4. The National Party rose to power in South Africa in 1948 on a pledge to extend patterns of White supremacy and racial segregation—both statutory and customary—that had developed over the previous two centuries. The party, in fact, coined the word "apartheid," meaning "apartness" or "separation," to encapsulate its pledge and to serve as its campaign slogan. The appeal of that pledge and slogan reflected the rise of Afrikaner identity and the depth even then of White concerns over the impetus that post–World War II forces of industrialization, urbanization, and nationalism gave to pressure from other racial groups for wider political, economic, and social rights.

5. During the 1950s, successive National Party governments enacted laws that more strictly codified racial separation in the social, economic, and residential spheres. Under Prime Minister Verwoerd, the party embraced as doctrine the concept of "grand apartheid." Verwoerd's theory centered on the notion that the tribal reservations that had already been set aside for exclusive use of the main African tribes could become nominally independent states where Blacks could fulfill their political aspirations. In essence, the theory proposed that Blacks provide labor for the White areas of South Africa but return to their reserves or "homelands" upon completion of their contract. No plan was offered for even theoretical autonomy for Coloreds or for Asians, who had no historically or geographically defined territorial bases.

6. Working from Verwoerd's blueprint, successive Nationalist governments by the early 1970s had devised the complex and interwoven policies of economic, political, and social discrimination and control known as "separate development." The main features of apartheid are by now well known:

— As the result of the process of enforced territorial segregation, most Blacks have been made legal

residents of 10 rural and economically deprived tribal homelands. These homelands make up about 13 percent of South Africa's territory.

— Blacks are permitted to exercise basic political rights only within the homelands in which they hold citizenship. The government operates separate and inferior health facilities and educational systems for Nonwhites, and public transportation is generally segregated. Interracial marriages are prohibited, and mixed social activities are discouraged. "Petty apartheid" regulations normally bar Nonwhites from restaurants, hotels, theaters, and other public facilities.

— Within "White areas," Coloreds and Asians must live in specially zoned residential areas; with a few exceptions, Blacks qualifying for residency outside the homelands must live in designated Black townships.

— "Influx control" laws stipulate that Nonwhites can be in White areas only by permission; the burden of proof that they are authorized to be in the areas rests upon them.

— Two separate labor markets exist: one for Whites made up largely of skilled and management positions, in which there are personnel shortages; and one for Blacks consisting of unskilled and semiskilled jobs, in which there are massive personnel surpluses. Pay scales for Nonwhites tend to be lower than for Whites, even for comparable work.

The police and a large bureaucracy enforce the repressive laws, including sweeping powers of arrest and detention, which shore up the system. Under influx control alone, for example, Nonwhites are subject to more than 2,000 laws and regulations; the government acknowledges having arrested more than 5 million Blacks over the past decade for violating the pass laws.

Forces for Change

7. ***Political Pressures.*** The pressures for racial reform that South Africans are feeling today are the product of a complex dynamic. External pressures in the form of increasingly hostile international opinion and the steady advance of Black nationalism in southern Africa have helped bring about a reappraisal of racial policy, but they have not by themselves been sufficient to bring about significant change. In fact, one major effect of criticism from abroad and the threat or actual imposition of sanctions has been to spur Pretoria to embark on a program to make South Africa militarily and economically independent—and thus less susceptible to outside leverage.[1]

8. External pressures have been accompanied by internal unrest. Indeed, as Blacks have become urbanized and consequently less divided along tribal lines, they have also become more aware of the world beyond South Africa's borders. The decolonization process in Africa in the late 1950s and early 1960s encouraged many Nonwhites in South Africa to believe that historical trends improved the prospects for the eventual destruction of the apartheid system. During this period the African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-Africanist Congress (PAC) organized large-scale antiapartheid demonstrations which culminated in the Sharpeville massacre of 1960. Subsequently both organizations were banned, and Black political activity in general was suppressed. A long period of quiescence ended with the Soweto riots of 1976, which were partially linked to the coming to power of Black majority governments in Angola and Mozambique.

9. Apartheid has also been undermined by its failure to meet its own goals, particularly the physical separation of the races. An annual growth rate of almost 3 percent in the Black population and the meager job opportunities in the homelands have resulted in increased migration of Blacks to urban areas—a reversal of the flow Verwoerd envisioned. Blacks outnumber Whites in almost all urban centers and the relative numerical position of Whites continues to decline. (See population estimates in figure 1.)

10. ***Economic Pressures.*** When the National Party came to power in 1948, agriculture and mining contributed more to the economy than did manufacturing and commercial interests. In 1979, the situation had reversed: industry and commerce were responsible for more than half of the national product. This has created a demand for Black skilled labor that cannot be filled within the constraints of apartheid. Low White birth rates and a decline in White immigration have significantly slowed the expansion of the White labor pool. In 1975, 41,000 new White jobseekers entered the labor market; in 1979, there were only 26,000 new White workers. The increasingly acute shortage of skilled labor has resulted in the elimination of job reservations in all but two sectors of the econo-

[1] See IIM 79-10025 for a detailed discussion of South Africa's efforts to make itself more immune to foreign economic pressures and to enable it to act with greater independence in the political and military fields.

Figure 1
SOUTH AFRICA:
Population Estimates by Percent, 1 July 1980



The figure for the total population is derived from a projection by the US Department of Commerce Foreign Demographic Analysis Division. Figures for the individual ethnic groups were calculated from official South African percentages for each group. The figures for the Afrikaans-speaking and English-speaking communities were calculated from the generally used ratio of 3:2 for Afrikaans speakers to English speakers.

Differing natural growth rates among South Africa's racial communities, accompanied by likely changes in emigration and immigration patterns, will produce a change in racial composition of the country's population in the decades ahead. The South African Department of Statistics projects an overall population of about 47,000,000 by the year 2000, of which 14 percent would be Whites, 73.4 percent Blacks, 9.9 percent Coloreds, and 2.7 percent Asians.

The South African Blacks are currently about evenly divided between those living in the homelands and those in the White areas (not counting about 1,500,000 migrant workers who take temporary employment in the White areas). Of those living in the White sector, 55 percent are in the towns and cities, 45 percent in rural areas.

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my and has led businessmen to work around many of the codified apartheid restrictions on Black labor.

11. The growing economic importance of Blacks—who now comprise 80 percent of the new entrants into the labor market and 64 percent of the labor force in the industrial heartland around Johannesburg—is beginning to give some skilled Black workers leverage. Since 1973, when traditionally docile Black labor shocked the White community by engaging in more than 200 strikes nationwide, urban Blacks have been making use of this leverage to demand better working conditions, higher pay, union recognition, and, increasingly, a general easing of apartheid restrictions.

12. Moreover, one of the major lessons the government drew from the riots in 1976 was that high levels of unemployment pose a serious danger to internal stability. Pretoria currently estimates that the economy needs to maintain an annual growth rate of 5.5 percent just to hold unemployment at the current level. Thus, continued economic expansion, once deemed important largely because of the material benefits derived by the White community, has now become vital in helping to keep Nonwhite frustrations in check.

13. When the National Party first came to power, these economic problems would have been mainly the concern of English speakers, who then owned most industries. By 1975, Afrikaner private business ownership, excluding agriculture, had grown from less than 10 percent in 1946 to almost 30 percent. Furthermore, the National Party, to counter English domination of the economy, has created or expanded 22 public corporations that control, among other sectors, the iron, steel, and coal industries, electrical production, and the manufacture of armaments and synthetic fuels. Afrikaner commercial and industrial leaders, who represent an increasingly significant segment of the Afrikaner elite, now comprehend that the continued adherence to separate development hampers economic growth.

The Debate Over Reform

14. Despite the steady erosion of apartheid's foundations, the broad Afrikaner consensus against any significant modification of the system did not start to break down until after the Soweto riots of 1976. The upheaval in this large Black township outside Johannesburg contributed to the undercurrent of unease set in motion by the emergence of hostile Black regimes

in Angola and Mozambique with close ties to the USSR, the onset of the worst recession since the 1930s, and increased Western activism against apartheid.

15. Viewing itself threatened by a "total onslaught" of hostile external and internal forces, Prime Minister Vorster's government sought to rationalize and orchestrate domestic and foreign policies in order to devise a more coherent strategy for maintaining White control. As part of this effort, the government allowed a relaxation of apartheid restrictions in such areas as sports, urban home leaseholds by Blacks, penalties for passbook violations, job discrimination, and segregation of public facilities. These measures were a pragmatic response to the rising external and internal pressures and to the prospect of increasing isolation from the West. The main impact, however, was to stimulate a debate, conducted until then largely within intellectual circles, over the necessity of more far-reaching changes in racial policies.

16. As the debate has intensified and spread within Afrikaner elites during the past few years, it has become clear that the quarrel is not over long-term objectives; Afrikaners remain collectively committed to maintaining White political dominance and protecting their privileges and identity. Progressive and conservative Afrikaners alike rule out any one-man, one-vote formula in a unitary state, believing that Whites would quickly lose control regardless of any guarantees. Three main lines of argument have developed, however, over issues of strategy and tactics.

— Conservative Afrikaners, popularly labeled *verkramptes* (literally, cramped ones) oppose any significant tinkering with apartheid. *Verkramptes* contend that even minor modifications in the principles of separate development will eventually undermine the entire system. Even among the *verkramptes* there are gradations. Some of them believe that certain aspects of petty apartheid can and should be eased to placate international critics. Others would improve the livelihood and general well-being of Nonwhites but strictly within the dogma of separate development. If the Verwoerdian model proves unattainable, there are *verkramptes* who believe that Afrikaners should retreat to a White homeland rather than experiment with modifications of the present system.

— The more politically moderate members of the Afrikaner elite, called *verligtes* (enlightened ones), recognize that the Verwoerdian model is seriously flawed and that domestic and international pressures for change will continue to build. They are prepared to throw up various facades of reform and of consultation and collaboration with Nonwhite elites but refuse any compromise on the fundamental principle of maintaining the White political monopoly. Their program includes not only a rollback of much of petty apartheid and a broad lifting of restrictions in the economic and labor fields, but also vague promises of eventual political concessions in return for the cooperation and collaboration of Nonwhite leaders. Reforms, the mainstream *verligte* argument goes, should be dispensed on a tactical basis to maximize their political impact internationally and within the Nonwhite communities while minimizing the practical effect on White power and on National Party unity.

— Progressives in the *verligte* camp—who can be termed the *verligte* vanguard and who are mainly journalists and academics—are prepared to experiment cautiously in the political realm. They would reshape the South African political structure by involving Coloreds and Asians in a limited form of decisionmaking and would include urban and homeland Blacks in a broader political confederation with consensus decisionmaking powers over certain matters. Whites would maintain authority over the great bulk of national resources and a veto over any policy that might adversely affect White interests.

17. The *verligtes* seek to co-opt Coloreds, Asians, and limited numbers of urban Blacks into a new Nonwhite middle class that would act as a buffer against a Black revolution. *Verligte* arguments, or at least the mainstream strategies, have found sympathetic audiences within important sectors of the Afrikaner community. Businessmen want freedom from government regulations that hamper industrial efficiency, including apartheid restrictions on the mobility, training, and employment of Black labor.

18. The largely Afrikaner officer corps in the Defense Force also has embraced *verligte* views. The Soweto riots, coupled with the disappearance of friendly White buffer states, have created the specter of what South African defense planners fear most—a combination of internal revolt and external attack. Having embarked on a program of force expansion that involves increasing recruitment of Nonwhites and progressive elimination of petty apartheid within the

services, the military has made plain its concern that civilians are lagging behind in making changes to dampen domestic and international discontent.

19. *Verligte* views have also found a sympathetic audience in the increasing numbers of urbanized and educated Afrikaners. This growing upper middle class has drifted away from traditional culture and values into an increasingly affluent and more relaxed lifestyle. These Afrikaners are willing—even anxious—to have the government devise more flexible and pragmatic approaches to race relations. *Verligte* views are also making inroads among some younger clergymen in the Dutch Reformed Church, hitherto a bastion of *verkrampte* doctrine, as well as on campuses of the traditionally conservative Afrikaner universities.

20. The *verkrampte* argument appeals to a powerful quarter in the Afrikaner community: lower-level civil servants, including the police; blue-collar workers, primarily in the mining sector; and farmers. These groups, which feel most intensely the need for either job protection or the supply of cheap Black labor that apartheid has assured, once formed the dominant strand of the National Party, although their influence is declining. Led by Transvaal party chief Andries Treurnicht (see figure 2), the *verkrampte* faction in the party—estimated to command the loyalty of up to 40 of the 135 Nationalist members of Parliament—has been able to block some *verligte* initiatives by capitalizing on Afrikaner traditions of consensus decisionmaking and the party's historic fear of a split. In addition, the Treurnicht faction could probably count on the support of as many as 40 other members of the party caucus on some issues.

Reform Under Botha

21. When he took office two years ago, P. W. Botha (see figure 3) had been in the public eye for more than 12 years as Defense Minister and head of the National Party's Cape Province branch. Cape politicians have a relatively moderate tradition within the National Party, and during the years Botha held the defense portfolio the military had begun to drop racial barriers in the defense forces. But Botha was generally regarded as a hardliner because of his role as architect of South Africa's intervention in Angola in 1975 and because of his clashes with government leaders over this and other issues, and most observers placed him on the *verkrampte* side of the debate over racial reform.

22. His previous reputation notwithstanding, Botha has led the way in changing the style and tone of gov-



nment dealings with the Nonwhite community, adopting the rhetoric of change, and becoming the first South African prime minister to visit a Black township—Soweto—and a homeland. He has consulted with some Blacks—homeland leaders and moderate urban spokesmen—and has introduced a series of reform proposals with considerable fanfare.

23. *New Constitutional Structures.* Efforts at constitutional reform began in 1976 under Prime Minister Vorster when Botha, then Minister of Defense, chaired a Cabinet committee that drew up a plan to create separate Colored and Asian parliaments at the national level that would have limited autonomy in local affairs. This plan was endorsed by the National Party but rejected by Coloreds and Indians on the grounds that it ignored the political irations of Blacks.

24. After moving up to the prime ministership in 1978, Botha scrapped this plan and set up a commission under then Interior Minister Schlebusch to find alternative solutions. Botha's new plan for constitutional reform was revealed early in 1980 in an interim report by the Schlebusch commission and given legal life in a constitutional amendment passed by Parliament last May. The principal institutional innovation was the President's Council, a deliberative body of 60 Whites, Coloreds, and Asians under the chairmanship of State Vice President Schlebusch, whose new post was created by the amendment.

25. The Council, whose members are appointed for five-year terms, was officially installed on 6 October 1980, with 44 Whites, 10 Coloreds, five Asians, and one Chinese South African agreeing to serve on it; most of the Nonwhite members are not recognized leaders of their communities. Botha appears intent on making the Council an important component of the government. To enhance their prestige, Council members will receive the same salaries as members of Parliament and will be housed in new, impressive offices in Cape Town, the country's legislative capital. The Council has five subcommittees—constitutional, scientific, economic, planning, and community relations—in which specific problems between the races are to be discussed.

26. The Schlebusch proposal also envisioned a Black advisory council of urban representatives and homeland leaders, on which the President's Council could call at its discretion for advice and consultation. Botha dropped the concept altogether after major Black leaders objected to the secondary status it conferred on Blacks. Blacks still have no representation on the national level.

27. ***Homelands Policy.*** Under Botha, the government has continued to push the homelands (see figure 4) toward political "independence." Botha recently admitted that the homelands are not economically viable, thereby tacitly acknowledging that for all practical purposes the classic homelands policy of apartheid has failed. The homelands, however, are central to Botha's revamped "constellation of states" plan—a concept devised originally to strengthen and reinforce existing economic links and to create a system of alliances and informal arrangements for military cooperation between South Africa and its relatively dependent neighbors in southern and eastern Africa. Following Robert Mugabe's victory in Zimbabwe, Pretoria scaled down the plan's geographical limits to the Republic and its homelands.

28. In 1979 Venda became the third nominally independent homeland. Ciskei will probably soon become the fourth. The government has failed, however, to persuade the vast majority of Blacks that there are political and economic benefits to be derived from residence in the homelands.

29. Politically, one major sticking point has been the question of citizenship. As Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda have become independent, their residents along with tribally related urban Blacks have lost South African citizenship and attendant rights. This has aroused bitter opposition among Blacks, who contend that the government is trying to make them aliens within their own country.

30. The issues of land consolidation and economic aid have been equally contentious. The consolidation of the geographically disparate homelands—the nonindependent homeland of KwaZulu alone is made up of at least 30 fragments of land—would require the acquisition of large amounts of White-owned property. Aside from commissioning new studies of the problem, the Botha administration is unwilling to accept the considerable economic and political costs that a serious consolidation program would incur.

31. Botha's economic aid program for the homelands has not differed significantly from Vorster's. Pretoria continues to provide operating expenses—and seconded White bureaucrats—for the homelands administrations, but development aid remains scanty. Botha's efforts to persuade the South African private sector to assume some of the burden for improving economic conditions in the impoverished homelands have been unproductive so far.

32. ***Limited Autonomy for Urban Black Communities.*** Despite his unwillingness to countenance a direct consultative role for Blacks in the new constitutional machinery, Botha has continued Vorster's cautious program for extending limited autonomy to some Black townships. In October 1980 the government published legislation it intends to submit to Parliament which would establish municipal authorities that would replace the 312 existing community councils. These new local Black authorities would have legal status equivalent to that of local White governments. The decisions of the Black municipalities would, however, be subject to the veto of the Department of Cooperation and Development. Unless the government wins the approval of key Black leaders, its new legislation will suffer the fate of past solutions proposed from above: it will be made meaningless and unworkable by the suspicions and passive resistance of the township residents.

33. ***Family Housing.*** An acute shortage of Nonwhite housing throughout South Africa has led the government to relax enforcement of the Group Areas Act for Coloreds and Asians. The Act requires segregation of residential areas and is one of the most important pillars of apartheid. Estimates of the shortfall in housing are now around 4,300 units for Asians, 10,000 for Coloreds, and perhaps as many as 400,000 for Blacks. In the Black township of Soweto alone, there is a shortage of at least 32,000 units.

34. The 1980 budget, which reflected the dramatic increase in gold prices, provided for a 20-percent capital increase for the national housing fund, but this does not begin to meet the pressing needs of Nonwhite communities. While admitting the need for the diversion of greater resources to housing, government officials have expressed hope that much of the slack will be taken up by the private sector—for example, by employers underwriting the mortgages of their workers. Botha's administration has tried to ease Black frustrations by following through on Vorster's promise to extend 99-year leaseholds to those few Blacks who qualify for "permanent residence" in the townships. If legislation proposed for the 1981 parliamentary session passes, more Blacks would qualify for leaseholds. In addition some inheritance rights for qualified dependents could be strengthened, making home ownership more attractive.

35. ***Education.*** In 1980, the government has increased spending on Black education and training pro-

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South Africa: Homelands **Figure 4**



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grams by 32 percent[3] and has given even higher priority to improvements in Colored schooling. The gap to be made up is enormous, however. Pretoria spends 10 times as much money per student on White education as it does on Black education.

36. The government recently announced that compulsory education for Blacks up to the age of 16 will be gradually phased in grade by grade in selective urban Black townships beginning in January 1981. Government officials have admitted, however, that the program will probably not be implemented on a countrywide basis for another 10 years.

37. ***Labor Reforms.*** In response both to growing pressure from the business sector for relief from apartheid bottlenecks that prevent more rational use of Black labor and to White concerns over the growing potential for labor unrest, the Vorster government in 1977 established two commissions to study the system of labor law and administration. The two commissions—named after their chairmen, Professors Wiehahn and Riekert—last year submitted reports containing what in the South African context were far-reaching recommendations. As a result of a *verkrampte* backlash some of the more progressive proposals were dropped and the intent of others was blunted or neutralized through legislative sleight of hand.

38. Under laws that ostensibly implement Wiehahn Commission recommendations, Black unions, which previously had no official status, now are offered the opportunity to register and bargain collectively in industrial councils that decide wage demands. Once a union accepts registration, however, it must submit to government oversight and refrain from political activity. The government has also formed two new bodies to encourage more efficient use of manpower: the National Manpower Commission and a new one-man Industrial Court.

39. The government has amended regulations that formerly prohibited Black entry into several skilled occupations and has eased travel and other restrictions on urban Black jobholders. At the same time, however, other new regulations make it more difficult for homeland Blacks to live and seek work in urban areas by imposing steep fines on employers who hire Blacks illegally.

40. ***Reform in the Military.*** In 1978, when Botha still held the defense portfolio, a study by the Defense Force recommended recruitment of 10,000 to 13,000 Nonwhites into the services as part of a general force expansion. In part, this goal reflected shrinkage of the available pool of White manpower as the booming South African economy absorbed more and more skilled manpower. The Defense Force has increased its Nonwhite volunteer component from approximately 1,500 men in 1977 to between 5,000 and 6,000 men in 1980. Coloreds make up the largest Nonwhite group in the services, followed by Blacks and Asians.

41. The military recently has accelerated its recruitment of Blacks, and Botha has announced the formation of four Black battalions. Although there are still slight differences in pay scales and separate recreational and housing facilities for Nonwhites, the economic benefits and the gradual elimination of petty apartheid within the services have made military duty attractive to them. The military also appears serious about accepting more Nonwhites for training in highly skilled technical specialities.

42. Nonwhite soldiers serve tours of duty in the operational area in Namibia where they share common facilities with White troops. Botha has held up the example of racial cooperation in the military as a model for the nation.

Botha's Commitment

43. Despite Botha's actions over the past two years, major questions remain over the nature of his commitment to racial reform and the specifics of his strategy for change. Reflecting his Cape background, Botha appears to have greater sympathy for Colored aspirations and to be less impressed by the fears of the "black peril" felt by Afrikaners in areas of the country—especially the Transvaal—where the Black population is greater. Like Whites across the South African political spectrum, however, he has ruled out the possibility of one-man, one-vote in a unitary state. The label that fits Botha best is that of a political pragmatist; in describing his approach to race relations, Botha himself has recently been claiming to be practicing "the art of the possible."

44. Botha, perceiving that the momentum of Black nationalism is growing, appears to attach some urgency to the need for change. Indeed, he appears to believe that White survival may depend on the success or failure of his administration's efforts to adapt traditional apartheid to current realities. Botha has not, however, spelled out any specific blueprint or timetable for change. Instead, his approach to race relations over the past two years has been ad hoc. Some of his proposals appear to have been aimed at attracting

[3] This figure, along with the previous one for the housing budget, does not take into account South Africa's 15-percent annual inflation rate.

Nonwhite support. Others were trial balloons floated to test the limits of White toleration for change. Whatever the case, Botha has remained flexible, pressing or backing off from a given policy as circumstances have required.

45. Botha's goal—and that of the *verligtes* collectively—is to build a new middle class of Coloreds, Asians, and urban Blacks with enough stake in the system to want to defend it, alongside Whites, against outsiders and, if necessary, against less privileged South African Blacks. His vision is that of a large multiracial bloc, dominated by Whites, in which there are so many layers of partial privilege for Nonwhites that the lines of racial confrontation which exist today will become blurred.

46. Botha has been reluctant to push for goals too vigorously in the face of concerted *verkrampte* resistance. During the initial phase of his prime ministership, he acted as though the right wing of the party were irrelevant, admonishing the *verkramptes* to "adapt or die" and giving the impression he preferred them to leave the party rather than have them act as a drag on racial reform. At this time, however, Botha is not prepared to push change to an extent that might cause a split in the party—and the Afrikaner community. Such a split occurred in 1969 when extreme rightists broke away to form the *Herstigte* (Reconstituted) National Party, which has thus far not won a seat in Parliament. In several recent confrontations over reform-related issues, Botha avoided a showdown with *verkrampte* leader Treurnicht.[4]

[4] The *verkramptes* picked up three additional parliamentary seats recently when the ultraconservative English-speaking South African Party disbanded and joined the National Party. The historic enmity between Afrikaners and the English-speaking community has blurred somewhat in recent years and many conservative English speakers have little quarrel with apartheid policies. When the National Party based its 1977 general election campaign on a call for White unity, it received 80 percent of the popular vote. The two remaining English-speaking opposition parties, the Progressive Federal Party and the New Republic Party, have a combined total of 27 of the 165 elected parliamentary seats and offer no real political challenge to National Party rule. They have gone on record as favoring the removal of obvious racial discrimination and the establishment of some form of federalism. There seems to be no hope for a merger between the English speakers, however. The New Republic Party, whose eight parliamentary seats are mainly in Natal, is philosophically closer to the National Party on matters such as the preservation of segregated residential areas. In two recent parliamentary byelections there appeared to be collusion between the New Republic Party and the National Party against the Progressives. This could portend a closer New Republic Party–National Party parliamentary coalition.

Reform and the New Politics

47. Botha, while reluctant to confront the *verkramptes* head on, has shown no such hesitancy about trying to cut down to size another major impediment to reform—the swollen South African bureaucracy, which employs up to half the Afrikaner work force. Most civil servants are National Party members and are in the *verkrampte* camp. The vast majority of them are lower level bureaucrats who possess only modest qualifications. As administrators of apartheid regulations, they are intent on enforcing the existing laws; indeed they are dependent on them for their livelihood. Moreover, the mass of legislation that forms the apartheid system delegates to these bureaucrats—especially those in the Department of Cooperation and Development—the effective power to pick and choose how and when to implement change.

48. Botha has sought to overcome this built-in inertia within the government in two ways. First, he has cut the number of government departments by more than half and is leaving 12,000 jobs vacant. He has also created a new tier of department heads and has begun to fill this management level with people who have been successful in administration and management outside the civil service. Second, in a process that has been dubbed "government by permit and exemption," he has permitted owners and operators of restaurants, hotels, sports arenas, and similar facilities to apply for special permits exempting them from apartheid restrictions. Likewise, he has encouraged reform-minded industrialists to proceed with progressive measures such as the desegregation of facilities at their plants without waiting for the necessary legislation or administrative notices to complete their slow journey through the bureaucracy.

49. Botha has also moved to strengthen his ability to induce change through executive fiat. The Senate, which historically had a delay and review function, was abolished this summer as part of the constitutional renovation entailed in the establishment of the President's Council. Botha has also greatly expanded his own Prime Minister's Office and formalized the role of the State Security Council, a Cabinet-level committee patterned on the US National Security Council. In short, he has created within the executive branch a virtual minigovernment with increasing ability to plan and coordinate policy on its own, bypassing *verkrampte* obstructionists in the National Party's parliamentary caucus.

50. In staffing the top posts of his administration, Botha has gone outside traditional National Party circles and brought in a variety of experts. Academics, think-tank professionals, businessmen, and financiers have all found their roles shifting from the periphery to the center of government strategy planning. Botha has also packed the Cabinet with a coterie of *verligte* politicians, including Gerrit Viljoen, a leading *verligte* theorist.

51. Even more influential are the senior military officers Botha brought with him when he moved up from the Defense Ministry. Not only does General Magnus Malan (see figure 5) now sit in the Cabinet as Minister of Defense, but military officers are now so strategically placed on every important executive committee and working group of both the Cabinet and Prime Minister's Office that they have the opportunity to influence and monitor policy decisions in a way no parliamentary member and few Cabinet ministers can. Malan, at least, is counted among the *verligte* vanguard, having formulated the "80-20" theory which holds that only 20 percent of the threat to the country's stability is external, while 80 percent is internal and the result of Nonwhite grievances. Botha probably believes that giving more political influence to military leaders will be palatable to the Afrikaner community because of its respect for military institutions.

52. Another hallmark of the new politics under Botha has been the proliferation of government-sponsored consultative and investigative commissions. Finding parliament inadequate as a source of new ideas, the government has used these commissions to gather facts and make recommendations on issues of major concern. More important, South Africans of all races whose views would otherwise have never been heard by policymakers have been able to testify on such topics as Black labor and influx control, Black education, consolidation of the homelands, the future of the constitution, and the causes of Nonwhite riots. Commission reports receive widespread publicity and serve both to educate Whites on pressing problems and to condition them to the need for change. In the case of the Riekert, Wiehahn, and Schlebusch commissions and a few others, Botha has used their findings and recommendations to pressure parliament to pass legislation it would not have otherwise.

53. The most pronounced feature of the new politics Botha practices—and the one which seems to have the greatest implications for racial policy—is the entente that has developed between the government



and the private sector of the economy. Pretoria's newfound affinity for the business community reflects shifts in thinking that began during the latter years of the Vorster regime. In the wake of the Soweto riots the Vorster administration decided that high unemployment posed a serious threat to internal stability. Having concluded that optimum economic growth could be achieved only by providing the private sector with the scope and incentives for rapid expansion, Vorster's administration began gradually to curb growth in the public sector and in bureaucratic controls over private business.

54. Botha has taken Vorster's approach to the private sector and pushed it further and faster, seeking openly to enlist the aid of business in bringing about changes he is unable or unwilling to effect in other ways. The most notable single event in this courtship occurred in late 1979 when Botha met in Johannesburg with 300 business leaders to persuade them that they shared common concerns with the government. Promising a reduction in state controls, Botha asked for private industry's help in continuing to expand the economy and thereby create more jobs for Nonwhites. He also asked for greater private sector investment in such areas as industrial job training programs and development projects for the homelands. To prove his good faith, Botha's next budget included, among a number of other stimulative measures, even more extensive tax concessions for business.

55. Businessmen have welcomed Botha's call for greater cooperation but have made plain their feeling that the government must do more. In complaining about the growing shortage of skilled labor, businessmen have pointed out that the policy of separate and inferior education for Nonwhites is sabotaging their industrial training programs, noting that very few Blacks reach an educational level high enough to qualify for apprentice training. Recently, two major English-speaking business groups appealed to the government to relax influx controls further and to provide more and better housing for Blacks. Both groups also expressed concern over the long-term contradictions inherent in the government's effort to create an integrated economy while maintaining a segregated political structure.

Nonwhite Reaction

56. Nonwhite attitudes toward Botha's approach to race relations have evolved in the last two years from an initial wait-and-see stance to a growing pessimism over the prospects for meaningful change. Many moderate Nonwhites who have participated in the discussions with the government have become discredited or discouraged. Despite strong-arm tactics by government security forces, urban Blacks, Asians, and Coloreds have become increasingly bold in rejecting government initiatives. Student demonstrations, consumer boycotts, and labor unrest—frequently accompanied by violence—have become commonplace.

57. ***Homeland Blacks.*** The leaders of the nonindependent homelands have proclaimed several principles on which future negotiations on independence should be based, including the retention of South African nationality for homeland citizens. The homeland leaders have been critical of most of the government's proposals for change. During a meeting in August 1980 with Botha, homeland leaders refused membership in the proposed Black Advisory Council, demanding that Blacks be included in the President's Council along with Coloreds, Asians, and Whites.

58. Homeland leaders have agreed, however, to continue meeting with government officials to discuss reform proposals. Black critics argue that these meetings represent a de facto Black advisory council. Indeed, homeland leaders are the most likely Black candidates for participation in any multiracial political institutions at the national level, largely because of the leverage the government has over them. Many homeland leaders, while having tribal chieftain status, would not occupy positions of political leadership without government backing; the constituency they eventually must answer to is not Black but the White bureaucracy in Pretoria.

59. ***Buthelezi.*** Gatsha Buthelezi, chief minister of KwaZulu, is the one homeland leader who does not fit the mold (see figure 6). He has built his Zulu-based political organization Inkatha into a grass-roots organization claiming 300,000 members, with a growing following in Soweto and other Black urban communities. The Zulus are the largest and most aggressive of South Africa's Black tribes. Buthelezi has advocated peaceful change. He indicated to the Schlebusch Commission in 1979 that he would support an interim program of piecemeal but concrete reforms such as the abolition of influx controls and the Group Areas Act. Botha's failure to initiate such reforms and the government's proposal of a Black advisory body with only consultative powers disillusioned Buthelezi.

60. Recently, Buthelezi has refused to participate personally in any future meetings between homeland

leaders and government officials, insisting instead on bilateral meetings with Pretoria's representatives. Buthelezi's move appears aimed in part at dissociating him from other homeland leaders who might compromise with the government. Buthelezi has also established a commission of his own to study prospects for racial reform in Natal Province, in part at least to bolster his claim to special status among Black leaders. He has staked his political future on the government's eventual willingness to offer Blacks some meaningful share of political power, and, by solidifying his position as the one national Black leader with whom Pretoria must deal, he hopes to gain real concessions.

61. Pretoria has so far apparently refrained from using the same arm-twisting tactics on Buthelezi it has employed on other homeland leaders. While Buthelezi has been a voice of moderation during recent protests, he also has often warned that his ban against violence is not an absolute one. The specter of an alliance between Inkatha—with Buthelezi's organizational abilities—and antigovernment militants clearly tempers Pretoria's thinking about its options for dealing with him.

62. Time, however, is working against Buthelezi's aspirations for national Black leadership. The longer it takes for the government to propose acceptable reforms, the more skeptical Blacks will become about the wisdom of Buthelezi's pragmatic policy of nonviolence. Many Blacks already believe that Buthelezi is only seeking power for the Zulus. Many urban Blacks who have refused to negotiate with the government unless it abandons the policy of separate development argue that Buthelezi, because of his position as a homeland leader and his willingness to negotiate with the government, does more harm than good to the Black cause.

63. ***Urban Black Leadership.*** Most urban Black leaders have also rejected the government's proposals for change. Prominent Black spokesmen, such as Dr. Nthato Motlana (see figure 7) of the Soweto Committee of Ten, oppose any cooperation with the government until it agrees to negotiate on the question of power sharing. Motlana refused to participate in elections in 1978 for a Soweto Community Council, and his boycott, coupled with the nonparticipation of Inkatha, resulted in a voter turnout of under 6 percent.

64. For the most part urban Black leaders have been unable to translate their demands into effective action. Recent attempts by the Committee of Ten to initiate a rent strike, for example, have been un-

successful. Once they emerge into the public eye, these urban Black leaders are particularly vulnerable to arrest and banning.[5] When persons such as Fanyana Mazibuko, leader of the Soweto Teachers' Action Committee, Curtis Nkondo, suspended president of the Azanian People's Organization, and Thozamile Botha, former head of the Port Elizabeth Black Community Organization, were banned, a public outcry ensued but no effective pressure was brought to bear against Pretoria. The vulnerability of urban Black leaders to government reprisals in large part accounts for their inability to organize an effective constituency.

65. Bishop Desmond Tutu, secretary general of the South African Council of Churches, is one of the few urban Black spokesmen who can claim a constituency, both within South Africa and abroad. Tutu recently led a delegation of church officials to meet with Botha to discuss race relations. Although the meeting was criticized by some Black militants, who warned Tutu against becoming a "South African Muzorewa," Tutu has been a harsh critic of Botha's policies. Last fall, while traveling abroad, he called for international disinvestment from South Africa and subsequently had his passport lifted. Tutu also advocates civil disobedience and was arrested for participating in a protest march against the government.

66. ***Black Consciousness.*** The recent wave of student demonstrations, job actions, and consumer boycotts reflects the general discontent of Blacks, Coloreds, and Asians with the pace of reform under Botha. The unrest has been largely unorganized and spontaneous, as the government has discovered through the failure of its traditional tactics of arresting or banning activist leaders. Much of the increasingly open dissent appears to be an outgrowth of the Black consciousness movement, a philosophical and cultural rejection of White attitudes and lifestyles that encourages Black pride and self-help.

67. During the mid-1970s Pretoria outlawed the organizations that formed under the banner of Black consciousness. New groups, most notably the Azanian People's Organization and several student bodies, have emerged, although they are kept under tight government control and surveillance. As a vaguely defined

[5] Banning is a form of house arrest that limits, for a specified period of time—usually three to five years—the social and political activities of an individual. A typical banning order might restrict a person to a particular town, limit his social contacts to members of his immediate family, and prohibit him from appearing at public gatherings. A banning order cannot be appealed.

social and cultural movement, however, Black consciousness continues to spread, particularly among Nonwhite urban youth. This new generation has little respect for Nonwhite leaders, particularly those willing to work for change within the existing system. It resents Botha and the *verligtes* collectively for trying to buy off Nonwhites with economic and social palliatives.

68. ***Coloreds and Asians.*** Although Botha has persuaded a handful of Coloreds and Asians to serve on the President's Council, he has not won the cooperation of these communities. Both groups have long enjoyed a standard of living considerably higher than that of urban Blacks, and, even before their inclusion on the President's Council, they had advisory bodies similar to the one recently proposed for Blacks. Coloreds, who once were able to vote for Whites to represent them in Parliament, still bitterly resent the National Party's moves to disenfranchise them. Asians, a small minority, are subject to prejudices from both Whites and Blacks, with the result that their leaders have a tradition of fence sitting on issues affecting race relations.

69. The most credible Colored and Asian leaders have rejected Botha's overtures. They have made it plain that their demand for full citizenship and full participation in the political process must extend to the Black population as well. The Coloreds are particularly cynical about Botha's pleas for patience, knowing the Afrikaners' historical concern about a political alliance between Coloreds and English-speaking Whites that would send the National Party down to electoral defeat.

70. Reflecting a growing community of interests and grievances, the younger generation of Asians and Coloreds, moreover, is beginning to identify closely with urban Blacks. Colored and Asian students and workers, some of them Black consciousness adherents, have participated in and or initiated a number of recent antigovernment demonstrations. Organizations with policies of noncollaboration with the Whites, most notably the Unity Movement among the Coloreds and the Natal Indian Congress, have developed significant constituencies among politically sophisticated Coloreds and Asians.

71. ***The Insurgent Groups.*** Although the Pan-Africanist Congress is still attempting to recover from the setbacks it suffered in the early 1960s and the factionalism that has plagued it since, the African National Congress is showing signs of resurgence. During its years in exile, the ANC was sustained by its longstanding ties to the South African Communist Party and the USSR, although it was unable to develop contacts with newly emerging Black activists inside South Africa. The ANC, however, has benefited significantly from the racial unrest since Soweto and from the disappearance of White buffer states. It has won new recruits from Nonwhite youths fleeing police crackdowns at home and has gained springboards abroad for staging attacks. The result has been a gradual increase in the level and sophistication of operations, marked in 1980 by dramatic attacks against police stations, a suburban bank near Pretoria, and the SASOL synthetic fuel plants.

72. These operations have enhanced greatly the ANC's appeal to young urban Blacks. In fact, imprisoned ANC President Nelson Mandela (see figure 8) has become the symbol of liberation for Blacks. ANC theorists have recently begun to emphasize the important role student boycotts and Black labor unrest could have in intimidating the White community and in breaking down White authority. The ANC, however, is still not an effective organized resistance force inside South Africa. Successful ANC operations, in fact, have resulted in heightened government security measures and have brought neighboring countries that support the group under increased pressure from Pretoria.

Prospects for Change Through 1982

73. The scope and pace of change in South Africa's racial policies over the next two to three years will depend on a host of variables, not the least of which will be the attitudes of the Afrikaner community. At the beginning of Botha's third year in office, Afrikaners have more favorable views toward change than at any juncture in the country's history. This reflects both the impact of *verligte* admonitions over the need for reform and the conditioning effects of the limited changes already implemented. Recent polls show that a substantial majority of Afrikaners prefer Botha's cautious approach to change in race relations over any *verkrampte* retrenchment. Yet, Treurnicht and like-minded Nationalists have a powerful constituency, and even many Whites who consider themselves *verligtes* believe that significant changes have already occurred. Thus Botha—who must face a general election by November 1982, his first as Prime Minister—will continue to move gingerly on racial issues, advancing in those areas where White resistance is low and withdrawing or postponing proposals that elicit a significant White backlash.



74. The easiest and fastest changes will continue to take place in the realm of petty apartheid. More hotels, restaurants, and theaters will be opened to Nonwhites, more permits will be issued for mixed-race sporting events, and the gradual desegregation of public transportation will continue. A number of discriminatory statutes are scheduled to be eliminated in an omnibus bill in the 1981 parliamentary session. On the other hand, the Mixed Marriages and Immorality Acts will in all likelihood remain on the books.

75. Moreover, in order to build a small Black entrepreneurial class and revitalize the economically moribund urban business districts, the government will probably follow through with its plans to revise the Groups Areas Act. As a result, Nonwhites would be allowed to establish small businesses in central parts of the currently all-White cities. As long as such revisions do not affect residential areas, most Whites will have little trouble accepting them.

76. Pretoria will extend greater local autonomy to the town councils and other government-created bodies in the larger Black townships in order to enhance the credibility of cooperative urban Black leaders, probably even ceding some control over the raising and allocation of revenue. The next two years are also likely to see significant increases in government spending for urban Black housing and for extending basic services such as water and electricity to the Black communities.

77. Botha can be expected to encourage industry to close the gap between White and Nonwhite pay, and the government may become involved in the current effort by Nonwhite labor groups to set a minimum "living wage." Greater cooperation between industry and government in easing the shortage of skilled labor is inevitable. Training a skilled Black worker is costly—about nine times as expensive as subsidizing the passage of a skilled White immigrant—and private industry, despite the provision of tax incentives, has yet to embark on training programs extensive enough to make a dent in the shortage. The government consequently will probably follow through with its plans to help establish about 300 industrial training centers and 12 new Black technical institutes, including one in Soweto.

78. To meet industry's demands for "trainable" entrants into the labor market and to help dampen student unrest, Botha appears prepared to undertake significant changes in the education system. His most likely course will be to set up a common syllabus for

Blacks, which could be followed by creation of a single Ministry of National Education to administer separate education for each racial group. While expenditures for Nonwhites might take a quantum leap under a unified educational ministry, differences will remain between per capita spending for White and Nonwhite students. Bringing Nonwhite facilities up to the level of White facilities would alone entail staggering costs, and Whites will not condone having their own educational standard lowered to subsidize improvements for Nonwhites.

79. Programs for the expansion and consolidation of the homelands will in all likelihood continue to exist largely on paper; the political and financial costs of buying up White-owned farmland and transferring it to Black control will remain prohibitive over the next two to three years. Some incorporation can be expected, however, along the lines of Mafeking, an economically distressed White town that was absorbed by a neighboring Black homeland, with extensive safeguards for Whites, including the retention of their South African citizenship.

80. Botha will undoubtedly face up to the Black citizenship issue by devising a convoluted plan requiring Blacks to become citizens of the independent homelands while extending a common South African identity and passport. This and other aspects of future homelands policy will not go down well with the *verkramptes*, who will argue that a shared economy and common national identity will inevitably fuel demands for political power sharing.

81. As part of a new regional approach to economic development and planning for the homelands, Botha is trying to breathe life into plans to build a series of industrial parks along homeland borders and to target existing industrial centers near the homelands for increased government and private investment. In an attempt to make these plans work, the government will probably share control over the industrial parks with the homelands governments and will probably give the homelands a portion of the taxes and profits generated. Nevertheless, the homelands remain economically unviable—unable to offer the jobs that would stem the flow of Blacks into the cities, or even to achieve much productivity in their basically agrarian economies.

82. In discussing possible future political dispensations for Nonwhites, Botha has hinted at a reorganization of South Africa's political structure on a "consociational" and confederal basis that would, according to some of his interpreters, resemble the Swiss cantonal system. Cooperation and Development Minister Koornhof has described the proposed system as one in which Blacks—and presumably other ethnic groups—would, choose local governments, which in turn would be involved with decisionmaking on national issues at a confederal or federal level.

83. Whatever other institutional innovations Botha introduces over the next two to three years, the determination he has shown in creating the President's Council suggests that it figures importantly in his plans. Botha has yet to reveal its exact functions beyond vague generalities. For the short term, the Council will play only an advisory role; its five standing committees may replace some of the many investigatory and consultative commissions appointed by Parliament.

84. The government will probably devise some replacement for the rejected Black advisory council. Blacks could eventually be allowed membership on the President's Council. In such a case, urban and nonindependent homelands leaders may be included in the Council, with some associative role for the independent homelands.

Implications for Stability

85. Government reforms will continue to lag behind Nonwhite expectations and will undoubtedly be rejected by Nonwhite youths and intellectuals. Policy changes that would have partially satisfied Nonwhite demands several years ago are only now being made. In addition, Blacks, Coloreds, and Asians alike recognize that Botha's objective is not the creation of a multiracial government but the preservation of effective White control. Government persistence in unilaterally devising formulas for change and then, under the guise of "consultations," presenting reforms on a take-it-or-leave-it basis will continue to reinforce this skepticism.

86. Over the long term, Botha's program will probably result in significant improvements in living conditions for some Nonwhites. Within the majority Black population, however, the primary benefactors of government programs will be the 10 to 15 percent of Blacks who have urban residency rights. Life for homeland and rural Blacks will probably remain one of grinding poverty. Equally important, it will take several years for improvements to materialize for urban Blacks, and an even more volatile situation could

develop as expectations for change far outpace the government's ability to deliver.

87. More fundamentally, Botha's strategy for creating an urban Black middle class may be bankrupt; even if it is successfully implemented it may do little to assuage Black demands for full political rights. Botha's failure to achieve even the beginnings of rapprochement with the Colored and Asian communities is a case in point. Coloreds and Asians long have benefited from greater government attention, and on paper they are equal partners with Whites in the President's Council. Yet most of their leaders regard government initiatives as halfway measures at best and are demanding full political rights, not only for themselves but also for Blacks. More important, Colored youths, as the recent wave of school boycotts show, are even more impatient than their parents in demanding economic and political progress; improvements in the past are irrelevant to the young. Thus, government moves to allow Blacks to buy homes or to improve their education are unlikely to satisfy current Black demands. Moreover, a new Black middle class may well produce a younger generation which, like today's Colored youth, will have even greater expectation for change.

88. At best, many urban Blacks will remain apathetic to government-created bodies such as the Soweto Community Council. If Black leaders such as Motlana or Buthelezi agree to participate in new collaborative structures, they will probably use them as platforms for demanding even more change. Botha will then be faced with the choice of meeting some of these demands to give credibility to those willing to cooperate with the government, or ignoring the demands and creating even greater tensions than would have occurred in the absence of the collaborative structures.

89. Black workers, fewer than 1 percent of whom are now unionized, will become more organized and more confident of their abilities to force economic—as well as political—concessions from management and government. Black consumers, as they have in recent months, will continue to support striking workers by boycotting products and protesting increases in the cost of living. The government could respond to these developments by cracking down on Black unions and consumer organizations. Such actions, however, would only work against attempts to establish a Black middle class with a vested interest in maintaining the status quo.

90. With Botha unlikely to introduce reform quickly enough to satisfy Nonwhite demands, the tempo of racial violence will probably quicken during the next two years. The government will be forced to deal simultaneously with two distinct forms of domestic discontent—actions by laborers and consumers aimed at improving economic conditions and more violent, less focused demonstrations by militant Nonwhite youths seeking more fundamental reforms. There may be increasing linkages among these groups.

91. For their part, the Black insurgent groups, primarily the ANC, will continue to pull off occasional spectacular operations, possibly with increasing frequency. Government security forces, however, probably will be able to prevent urban terrorism from becoming a serious threat to the government. The ANC will increase its efforts to infiltrate student and labor movements but will continue to be hampered by government security measures. Given the growing poverty and despair of rural and homeland Blacks, the ANC may find it easier to expand its activities in rural areas. Nonetheless, rural violence is likely to remain less significant than urban violence.

92. Between now and the end of 1982, racial violence could at times become sufficiently intense and widespread to raise questions about Pretoria's ability to contain it. Nevertheless, the overall pattern of unrest is likely to remain that of largely spontaneous eruptions over specific local grievances. Lacking overall organization and leadership, these disturbances will probably continue to be quelled by harsh police measures. Crackdowns against activist leaders will follow, along with remedial but incomplete reforms. South Africa is highly unlikely to break out of this self-perpetuating cycle of violence and partial reform over the next three years. Indeed, Botha, who has not hesitated to use the tools of repression in the past, may feel compelled to demonstrate to his White constituency that, while he is determined to give Nonwhites a better deal, he is equally determined to move harshly against Nonwhites who refuse to do it his way. Botha recently hinted for the first time that the Army could be deployed inside South Africa to contain violence.

93. Faced with racial unrest and *verkrampte* resistance to his reform program, Botha will in all likelihood continue to concentrate power in his own hands and those of the new technocratic-business-military elite at the expense of Parliament. So far there has been little White opposition to the shift in the locus of power. Although Whites are attached to their par-

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liamentary institutions, many would acquiesce if Botha deemed it necessary to scrap or circumvent them in order to deal with Nonwhite violence or *verkrampte* obstructionism. Botha is unlikely to feel himself under this degree of pressure before the end of 1982, but he appears to be positioning himself to be able to run South Africa as a strongman at some point in the future.

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